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24 February 1959


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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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24 February 1959

# I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Peiping to grant \$5,000,000 in aid to Algerian rebels. [redacted]

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Shah of Iran enraged by Khrushchev's criticism.

Nasir's speech reflects preoccupation with UAR-USSR relations.

Lebanon - Government concerned over increased UAR activity; seeking top-level meeting with UAR. [redacted]

Cambodia - Government troops seize Dap Chhuon's headquarters; he escapes.

Ceylon - General strike postponed but tension remains high.

Somalia - Violence possible during early-March elections; police taking emergency measures.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

24 February 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China - Algeria: Communist China plans to give the Algerian rebel government \$3,000,000 worth of arms and ammunition, "provisions" valued at \$1,000,000, and \$1,000,000 in "foreign currency," [redacted]

m

The arms possibly include light weapons of US manufacture as requested by the Algerian rebel mission which visited Peiping in December. Deliveries may be made through the United Arab Republic, which in the past has often acted as middleman in arms supplies for the Algerian rebels. [redacted] (Page 1)

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iran-USSR: (The Shah is enraged by the strong public attack made on him by Khrushchev on 17 February. Iranian Prime Minister Eqbal believes that the Soviet Union's tough propaganda campaign against the Shah may have considerable internal repercussions and has again asked for American support and guarantees.) [redacted] (Page 2)

m

UAR-USSR: Nasir's 21 February speech in Cairo concerned largely domestic and Arab affairs, but it also reflected his preoccupation with Soviet relations. The recent letters exchanged between Nasir and Khrushchev show that both are directly interested in containing their differences and consequently are likely to make further appropriate gestures in that direction. However, their divergent policies, including those toward Iraq, are likely to continue creating problems in their relationship. [redacted] (Page 3)

ok

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

70 Lebanon: Arrangements are being worked out for high-level Lebanese-UAR discussions, possibly between President Shihab and Nasir. Increased UAR clandestine activity is a threat to Lebanon's precarious security situation, and Lebanese awareness of this may be the reason why Beirut is interested in discussions with UAR officials, which could occur this week while Nasir and his entourage are in Damascus. [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 4)

70 \*Cambodia: Government troops have seized the headquarters in northwestern Cambodia of General Dap Chhuon, chief plotter against the regime of Premier Sihanouk. Chhuon fled with some of his supporters. This action follows a declaration of dissidence against the Sihanouk regime sent by Dap Chhuon to King Suramarit formalizing the de facto break that had existed between Chhuon and Sihanouk for some time. [redacted]

70 Ceylon: The one-day general strike planned for 23 February has been postponed, possibly until 3 March. Tension remains high, however, and powerful plantation labor unions are reported willing to join Colombo's urban workers when they strike. [redacted]

ok Somalia: Violence is anticipated during elections for a legislative assembly in the Italian trust territory of Somalia from 4 through 8 March. The 90-member assembly selected will draft the constitution and make other preparations for independence in 1960. The opposition party, boycotting the election in protest against questionable electoral methods employed by the Somali Youth League--the ruling party--may engage in violence, including attacks on foreigners and destruction of foreign installations. Police are aware of the threat and are taking emergency measures. [redacted] (Page 6)

70 Morocco: Abdelkhalek Torres, an important nationalist leader and Moroccan ambassador to Cairo, intends to resign and return to active politics. Torres' decision probably has the approval of the King, who may look on him as a conservative and as an acceptable future premier. Premier Ibrahim had [redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

wanted Torres to remain in Cairo, but was presumably over-ruled by the King. An adherent of the Istiqlal party's right wing, which is still struggling with the left wing for party control, Torres will try to strengthen the right wing's following in northern Morocco. If he fails, he may try to reconstitute the Islah, his former party, which had a wide following in the North. [redacted]

[redacted] (Page 7)

710  
\*USSR-Pakistan: [A Soviet threat to fly three IL-14 transport aircraft from Kabul to New Delhi via Lahore on 22 February across a prohibited area near Peshawar in northern West Pakistan failed to develop. After the Pakistanis refused the Soviet request and stated that appropriate action would be taken against the aircraft, two Soviet IL-14's flew the authorized air corridor without incident on 23 February. Pakistan will probably use this potential incident to support its contention that it cannot stand firmly with the West and defy the USSR if it does not receive adequate economic and military assistance from the United States.] [redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

iii

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Communist Chinese Arms Aid to Algerian Rebels

[redacted]  
[redacted] the Chinese Communist Government had decided to supply the Algerian "Provisional Government" with \$5,000,000 worth of military aid and money. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said the grant is to include \$3,000,000 worth of arms and ammunition--possibly of US manufacture. [redacted]

[redacted]  
the Algerians had requested China's help in procuring arms of US manufacture and that the Chinese had approved the supply of a limited number of light weapons. The Chinese gift also will include \$1,000,000 worth of provisions--possibly auxiliary military and medical equipment--and \$1,000,000 in foreign currency --possibly sterling or US dollars.

[redacted]  
Peiping faced a "great problem" in transporting the arms--probably meaning the problem of shipping the arms to the UAR. Peiping stipulated in December that the supply of arms to the Algerian rebels was contingent on the UAR's agreement to deliver the arms to the rebels after China had first transported the materiel to the UAR. Cairo in the past has frequently acted as the middleman in buying and transshipping arms to the Algerian rebels. [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Iranian-Soviet Relations Becoming Increasingly Strained

(The Iranian Government, while maintaining a tough public posture, is becoming worried over possible domestic and foreign repercussions from the sharp and continuing Soviet propaganda attack since the Soviet-Iranian discussions ended in anger on 10 February. Prime Minister Eqbal is appealing for strong public assurances from London and Washington. He has asked for statements to the effect that Iran's security and integrity are of primary importance and that Soviet aggression against Iran would not be tolerated. Eqbal believes such support of the regime would bolster Iranian morale and discourage antigovernment activity. He also suggests that foreign praise of Iran's evolutionary social and economic progress and potential would be beneficial.)

(Eqbal's concern over the worsening situation is further emphasized by his claim that Soviet Ambassador Pegov is spreading the warning around Tehran--among both Iranians and the diplomatic corps--that if Iran signs the proposed bilateral agreement with the United States, the Soviet Union will occupy Azerbaijan in northwest Iran. At a UAR Embassy reception on 22 February, however, Pegov denied that he had made such a statement. Eqbal says he regards Pegov's threat as "purely bluff" but fears such propaganda will arouse fear and concern among the Iranian people. Eqbal also maintains that Moscow has established a special agent training school near the western Soviet-Iranian border for purposes of stirring up activity against the Shah.)

(The Shah, who is enraged over Khrushchev's recent tough personal attacks against him and his family, is threatening to break diplomatic relations with the USSR unless a public apology is forthcoming. Ambassador Wailes believes it is very unlikely, however, that the Shah will actually go to this extreme.)

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Nasir's Anniversary Speech in Cairo

Nasir's Cairo speech commemorating the first anniversary of the union between Syria and Egypt emphasized his great concern with the unsettled conditions in Syria. He extolled the benefits and achievements of the regime in Syria since the union--land distribution, development projects, increased education opportunities, and exploitation of natural resources. Continual reference was made to Arab nationalism's mission to bring about "social revolution"--including both political and social democracy.

However, Nasir gave no hope to those who desire the rebirth of political parties, which he described as vestiges and tools of the former "imperialist" rule in the Arab states. As a sop to politically conscious Syrians, Nasir said a National Union would be organized immediately in Syria along the lines of its monolithic counterpart in Egypt. He promised elections in the near future to choose members for the executive committees of the Syrian and Egyptian National Unions; the committees will have the task of organizing the "social revolution."

Nasir also made his usual review of the Arab and international situations. The Baghdad Pact received a standard blast. Israel was treated in the context of increased Jewish emigration from the Soviet bloc--a "threat" he dismissed by quoting Izvestia's denunciation of Western reports that the USSR might permit some of its 3,000,000 Jews to leave for Israel.

Nasir referred to the ticklish problem of UAR-Soviet relations by mentioning Khrushchev's reaffirmation of Soviet support for the UAR in his reply of 20 February to a letter from Nasir. This and the Izvestia article reflected the Soviet leader's desire to prevent "ideological" differences from undermining governmental relations. Khrushchev's letter, which said Cairo's attitude toward Communism is solely an internal UAR matter, and the Izvestia article on Jewish emigration probably were timed to influence Nasir's speeches during the UAR anniversary celebrations. These conciliatory gestures may also have been timed to counter any possible adverse effects on Soviet-UAR relations of President Tito's visit to Cairo and Damascus.

Despite the Soviet assurances and Nasir's conciliatory reference to Iraq, it is doubtful that the struggle between the UAR and the Soviet Union for control in Iraq will be affected. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Lebanese President May Meet Nasir

Arrangements are being made for high-level Lebanese-  
UAR discussions, possibly between President Shihab and Nasir  
and perhaps during the UAR President's visit to Damascus this  
week. Shihab apparently has become alarmed at the clandes-  
tine activities of UAR agents which are threatening to upset  
Lebanon's precarious security situation.

[redacted] the  
Lebanese "Popular Resistance," a rebel paramilitary organiza-  
tion active during last summer's rebellion, has fallen under the  
control of UAR intelligence operating from Damascus. (One  
Lebanese Moslem leader is said to have warned Shihab that [redacted]  
agents from Syria are inciting tribesmen in northern Lebanon,  
and Ambassador McClintock reported on 27 January that the  
Syrians are supplying them with arms.) Caravans of arms com-  
ing from Syria have been reported in southern Lebanon also,  
while [redacted] the Lebanese Army  
intercepted a convoy of six trucks carrying arms to the Pop-  
ular Resistance in the Biqa Valley during late January. On  
22 February rioting between anti- and pro-Nasir partisans  
flared up in Beirut and required army intervention. (The Leb- [redacted]  
anese Army is said to be disgusted with UAR interference and  
may have brought pressure on Shihab for the meeting.)

Pro-UAR ex-President Bashara al-Khouri, who was de-  
posed in 1952, has begun a campaign to undermine the weak  
Shihab regime in the hope that he will succeed to the presidency.  
Other Moslem political leaders are presently engaged in a power  
struggle which is giving the pro-UAR Baath and the Communists  
an opportunity to build up support among the masses. Nearly all  
factions, including that of ex-President Chamoun, expect new  
parliamentary elections next summer or fall and are busily build-  
ing up their "war chests" of arms and money. Syrian police [redacted]  
[redacted] have expressed an almost pathological desire to exterm-  
inate the anti-Communist and anti-Nasir Social National party in  
Lebanon. [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

[REDACTED]

Cambodian Troops Seize Dissident's Headquarters

{Cambodian Government troops have seized Siem Reap, the headquarters in northwestern Cambodia of General Dap Chhuon, chief plotter against the regime of Premier Sihanouk. Chhuon fled with some of his supporters.}

{This action follows a declaration of dissidence against the Sihanouk regime sent by Chhuon to King Suramarit, formalizing the de facto break that had existed for some time between Chhuon and Sihanouk. Chhuon apparently had hoped to intimidate the government into a negotiated settlement of differences, although he was continuing preparations for an uprising with clandestine assistance from South Vietnam. His terms for calling off such a move had included Sihanouk's withdrawal from politics and the replacement of Cambodia's neutrality policy with a strongly anti-Communist posture.}

{The royal army's swift reaction in dispatching an armored convoy from Phnom Penh during the night of 21 February apparently achieved almost complete surprise. [REDACTED] two South Vietnamese officers were captured in Chhuon's house and that "most" of Chhuon's headquarters officers and troops cooperated with the government force.}

{The government is also reinforcing its eastern frontier against the threat of a diversionary move by South Vietnam, which had been readying dissident bands in the border area to intervene on Chhuon's behalf.}

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Rioting May Occur During March Legislative  
Elections in Somalia

Police officials in the Italian trust territory of Somalia fear that violence, including attacks on American and European interests, may erupt in connection with legislative elections from 4 to 8 March. Rumors alleging that the pro-Egyptian, opposition Greater Somalia League (GSL) plans to attack Italian, American, and Ethiopian personnel and facilities appear to be an exaggeration. However, party president Hagi Mohammed Hussein admitted to police that hotheads might resort to violence, but he denied that a recent party congress resolved to use every means, including bloodshed, to ensure success of its election boycott.

The circumstances surrounding these important elections suggest that both the opposition and the ruling Somali Youth League (SYL) may resort to sporadic terrorism. The March elections will determine which party will write Somalia's constitution, select its form of government, and guide the new state after its scheduled independence in December 1960. The Somali Youth League, presently of pro-Western orientation, has already used its control of the police and administration to hamper the opposition's registration and to jail several of its leaders.

The expected lopsided Youth League majority--already assured of at least 55 of the 90 seats--may itself cause the party grave difficulties. A lack of legislative opposition will favor the re-emergence of bitter tribal animosity within the governing coalition and probably be reflected in the police and administrative staffs. Furthermore, the questionable election methods employed by the SYL will furnish opposition groups and their UAR sponsor excellent propaganda material. Such charges of corruption could play a significant role in 1960 when the United Nations will discuss the procedure for termination of the trusteeship preparatory to complete independence.

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Moroccan Leader Returns to Re-enter Politics

{Abdelkhalek Torres, leader of the nationalist Islah party which merged with the ruling Istiqlal party in 1956, intends to resign as Moroccan ambassador to Cairo and return to active politics. Ostensibly an Istiqlal neutral but publicly siding with Allal el-Fassi in the latter's struggle with left-wing dissidents for control of the party, Torres plans to rebuild his personal following in northern Morocco, where anti-Istiqlal tribal disorders have occurred during the past five months. He also intends to enlarge his following in other areas. He claims that in the as-yet-unscheduled municipal elections he is certain of at least 25 percent of all municipal assembly seats.}

{Torres' return to politics, opposed by left-wing Istiqlal Premier Ibrahim, apparently has the approval of King Mohamed V, who is concerned about instability in northern Morocco. Torres is reported to have demanded as his price for cooperation with the right wing a free hand in northern Morocco, early convocation of the postponed Istiqlal party congress, and adoption of a positive program. Should these conditions not be met, he probably would reconstitute the Islah party, which would further fragmentize Istiqlal and encourage a multiplicity of parties. The King, who has resisted past Istiqlal attempts to install a one-party political system, seems to favor a two-party rather than a multi-party system and for that reason may not have sanctioned at this time the desire of many Torres followers to break away from Istiqlal.}

{The King apparently discussed with Torres during an audience on 11 February the possibility of succeeding Premier Ibrahim, whose cabinet was installed in December as a stop-gap measure and was specifically charged with holding early municipal elections. American Ambassador Yost believes Torres is generally friendly to the West and would make a satisfactory premier. If invested as premier, Torres probably would follow the policy of his predecessors and demand the evacuation of foreign troops, including the American bases.}

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